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IMMUNITY CONFUSION: WHY ARE OHIO COURTS UNABLE 
TO APPLY A CLEAR IMMUNITY STANDARD IN SCHOOL-
BULLYING CASES? 
Liam H. McMillin 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a young student commits suicide because they were bullied at 
school, who do we blame? Who should be held liable for this student’s 
death? Should it be the student’s teacher? The administrators? The school 
district more broadly? Maybe no one at all? And how do we determine 
what conduct is blameworthy and what conduct is not? 
These questions are purposefully provocative; the subject matter itself 
is as provocative as it gets. Arising out of these exceptionally terrible 
moments are necessary questions of law. Legislatively and judicially, 
Ohio has failed to establish a clear standard to answer these questions. 
Some aspects are clear: Ohio statutes afford immunity from civil liability 
to individual employees of a political subdivision, which includes a public 
school, with a few limited exceptions.1 The policy reasons for these 
immunity grants are rooted in deep-seated immunity rationales.2 Until 
now, Ohio appellate courts have not agreed on a clear standard for when 
the exceptions should apply to individual educators in cases of bullying 
leading to injury to the student or the student’s suicide.3 
In the fall of 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio was presented with a 
chance to standardize the immunity afforded to educators. In A.J.R. v. 
Lute,4 the court heard a case where a young student was allegedly bullied 
by another student. In the suit, the bullied student and her parents argued 
that the educators should be liable for her injuries.5 A.J.R. is not a case 
where a bullied student committed suicide, but, as many in the legal 
 
 1.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744 (Lexis 2020). 
 2.  See generally Robert J. Schiavoni, Sovereign Immunity for Political Subdivisions in Ohio: 
The Past as Present, 13 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 203 (1986) (“The prominent and fundamental policies 
supporting immunity are the protection of public funds by avoiding burdensome litigation and costly 
settlements, and the need to protect the ability of local government to provide services.”) 
 3.  This Comment recognizes that the immunity analysis for other potential claims for these cases, 
such as federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, differs considerably from the state law 
considerations. Anecdotally, applying the “affirmative act” and “state-created danger” analysis, or 
perhaps the “deliberate indifference” standard, often applied in § 1983 cases would likely result in clearer 
and more effective standards, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. See Feucht v. 
Triad Local Schs. Bd. of Educ., 426 F. Supp. 3d 914 (S.D. Ohio 2019); Shively v. Green Local Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Educ., 579 Fed. Appx. 348 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussed later in this Comment, but not regarding 
constitutional claims). 
 4.  A.J.R. v. Lute, 168 N.E.3d 1157 (Ohio 2020). 
 5.  Id. at 1158. 
1
McMillin: Immunity Confusion
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
308 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
profession have heard before, “bad facts can make bad law.” In the case 
presented to the court, undoubtedly a student was injured, presumably as 
a result of bullying. However, there is a clear contrast between cases with 
somewhat similar facts, but instead of a poke with a pencil (as in A.J.R.), 
a student commits suicide. In November 2020, the decision in A.J.R. did 
little to clarify the immunity standard for educators in school bullying-
suicide cases.6 The Court only further confused the standard and relied on 
seemingly contradictory precedent.7 In order to better understand the 
decision made by the justices in A.J.R., an investigation into immunity for 
educators in bullying cases and the standards applied in them is in order.8  
This Comment provides a general overview of immunity under Ohio 
state law, as it applies to individual educators, and a brief survey of Ohio 
cases where appellate districts have ruled on these standards in bullying-
suicide cases. Part II discusses immunity generally, addresses the Ohio 
statutes relevant to immunity, and then discusses the Ohio appellate court 
cases that apply the immunity analysis to cases of bullying. Part III argues 
that the standard specified in A.J.R. is woefully ineffective, contradictory, 
and ultimately dangerous, and argues the need to discern a clear standard 
of conduct that “pierces the shield” of educator immunity in school 
bullying cases. Lastly, Part IV looks briefly at the ramifications of the 
standard set by the Court on other individuals granted immunity in Ohio, 
and the broader problems created by this holding. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
reads: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”9 The common-law doctrine of immunity 
intends to protect the “‘government’s ability to perform its traditional 
functions’ by providing immunity where ‘necessary to preserve’ the 
ability of government officials ‘to serve the public good or to ensure that 
talented candidates were not deterred by the threat of damages suits from 
entering public service.’”10 Immunity, in short, is intended to entice 
 
 6.  Id. at 1160. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  For an evaluation of the arguments presented at oral argument in A.J.R., see Marianna 
Bettman, What’s On Their Minds: Are Educators Liable for Bullying Injuries? A.J.R., et al. v. Board of 
Education of Toledo City School District, et al., LEGALLY SPEAKING OHIO (Jul. 13, 2020), 
https://legallyspeakingohio.com/2020/07/whats-on-their-minds-are-educators-liable-for-bullying-
injuries-a-j-r-et-al-v-board-of-education-of-toledo-city-school-district-et-al/. 
 9.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 10.  Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 408 (1997) (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 
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people to work for the government and protect the functions of the 
government by preventing lawsuits that distract officials from their 
governmental duties. At the state level, there is a broad range of 
codification and application, often creating confusion between states.11 
A. Immunity Law in Ohio  
In Ohio, the common-law doctrine of immunity is codified in the 
Revised Code.12 Ohio immunity law does not provide specific 
determinations of immunity for schools and their employees. Rather, the 
broad immunity granted in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2744.03 applies to 
school employees. The statute, in part, reads: 
In a civil action brought against a political subdivision or an employee of 
a political subdivision to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to 
person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission in connection 
with a governmental or proprietary function, the following defenses or 
immunities may be asserted to establish nonliability. . .13 
For the purposes of this chapter, a political subdivision means “municipal 
corporation, township, county, school district, or other body corporate 
and politic responsible for governmental activities in a geographic area 
smaller than that of the state.”14 Simply put, regional or local 
governmental organizations or other groups engaged in governmental 
activities are considered political subdivisions. 
Employees of political subdivisions are immune unless: 
 
167 (1992)). 
 11.  For example, under Kentucky state law, “[q]ualified official immunity applies to the negligent 
performance of a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those involving the 
exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment; (2) in good faith; 
and (3) within the scope of the employee’s authority.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001). 
However, “an officer or employee is afforded no immunity from tort liability for the negligent 
performance of a ministerial act, i.e., one that requires only obedience to the orders of others, or when the 
officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific act arising 
from fixed and designated facts.” Id. (citing Franklin Cnty v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Ky.1997)). 
There is no mention of recklessness instead applies a negligence standard, but limits when that standard 
can be applied.  
  Kentucky complicates things further when it comes to immunity for governmental 
organizations. Counties in Kentucky are protected by sovereign immunity, municipalities are not. Wilson 
v. Cent. City, 372 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Ky. 2012). Municipalities are liable for negligent acts outside the 
legislative and judicial realms. Comair v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 
95 (Ky. 2009). But Kentucky courts are not clear on whether or not municipalities are protected by 
governmental immunity. In Yanero v. Davis, the court holds that a “governmental corporation [or agency] 
is ordinarily immune from suit while performing a public function.” 65 S.W.3d 510, 520 (Ky. 2001) 
(quoting Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 83 L. Ed. 784, 804-5, 306 U.S. 381 (1939)).  
 12.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01 et seq. 
 13.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A). 
 14.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(F). 
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[t]he employee's acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the 
employee's employment or official responsibilities; [t]he employee's acts 
or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or 
reckless manner; [or c]ivil liability is expressly imposed upon the 
employee by a section of the Revised Code.15  
Therefore, to “pierce the shield” of immunity and survive summary 
judgment against public school officials, plaintiffs in school bullying 
cases must be able to sufficiently prove that one of the exceptions listed 
in R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6) applies. 
B. Educators’ Conduct Under R.C. § 2744.03 
Generally, Ohio courts apply the O’Toole definition of recklessness 
when determining whether an employee of a political subdivision is 
immune under R.C. § 2744.03:  
an actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of others if he does 
an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to 
do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially 
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.16  
For conduct to be considered reckless under O’Toole, a reasonable person 
would realize that the conduct creates an unreasonable risk.17 Thus, 
recklessness is a higher standard than negligence, but lower than 
intentional.18 In the context of R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b), Ohio courts have 
held that “recklessness is a perverse disregard of a known risk.”19 In short, 
“the actor must be conscious that his conduct will in all probability result 
in injury.”20 
Despite the purported simplicity of the term, determining whether an 
educator acted recklessly in a bullying situation is far from 
straightforward. The Revised Code defines bullying as “[a]ny intentional 
written, verbal, electronic, or physical act that a student has exhibited 
 
 15.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(6)(a)-(c) (internal numeration omitted). 
 16.  O'Toole v. Denihan, 889 N.E.2d 505, 516-17 (Ohio 2008) (quoting Thompson v. McNeill, 53 
Ohio St.3d 102, 104-5 (1990) (quoting Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), §500)). As discussed 
later in this Comment, this broad and single use of “reckless” is problematic. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. See also McGuire v. Lovell, 85 Ohio St.3d 1216, 1219, 709 N.E.2d 841 (1995) (Moyer, 
C.J., dissenting); Jackson v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 76 Ohio App.3d 448, 454, 602 N.E.2d 
363 (1991) ("we recently held that the term `reckless' as used in [OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §] 
2744.03(A)(6)(b) means a perverse disregard of a known risk"). 
 20.  O’Toole, 889 N.E.2d at 516-17, (quoting Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio 
St.3d 351, 356, 639 N.E.2d 31 (1994)). 
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toward another particular student more than once,” causing the latter to 
experience mental or physical harm, and “[i]s sufficiently severe, 
persistent, or pervasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or 
abusive educational environment for the other student.”21 In other words, 
recurring acts directed toward other students causing them harm serious 
enough to disrupt the learning environment are considered bullying. In 
many school-bullying cases, the individual educator’s determination of 
whether or not bullying actually occurred plays an important role in 
establishing whether their conduct subsequent to that determination rises 
to a level that defeats immunity.22 
C. Ohio Cases That Apply the Immunity Analysis to Bullying 
1. Pre-A.J.R. Caselaw  
Before A.J.R., Ohio courts applied varying standards to individual 
employee’s conduct in school bullying cases. Some courts have applied a 
recklessness standard,23 others a wanton misconduct standard,24 and still 
others a “willful and wanton” standard.25 The court used a recklessness 
standard in Vidovic v. Hoynes.26 In Vidovic, the parents of Sladjana 
Vidovic, on their own behalf and the behalf of their daughter’s estate, 
filed a complaint against the superintendent of the Mentor Public School 
District and the principal and guidance counselor of Mentor Public High 
School.27 The Vidovics alleged that in 2008, their daughter committed 
suicide following months of bullying and harassment.28 The Vidovics 
argue that the defendants knew about the bullying and failed to 
intervene.29 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that the Vidovics failed to prove that the educators’ conduct rose 
to the level of wanton or reckless conduct.30 The district court granted 
 
 21.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 313.666(A)(2). 
 22.  The Revised Code’s definition of bullying as provided here rarely makes its way into the 
decisions. For the purpose of this Casenote, the focus remains on immunity and not the definition of 
bullying itself. See, e.g., Aratari v. Leetonia Exempt Vill. Sch. Dist., 2007-Ohio-1567 (7th Dist.); Golden 
v. Milford Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2011-Ohio-5355 (12th Dist.); and Vidovic v. Hoynes, 
2015-Ohio-712 (11th Dist.). 
 23.  Vidovic v. Hoynes, 29 N.E.3d 338 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). 
 24.  Estate of Smith v. Western Brown Local School District, 26 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). 
 25.  Mohat v. Horvath, 2013-Ohio-4290 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
 26.  29 N.E.3d 338 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). 
 27.  Id. at 341. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 341. 
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summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed.31 
Sladjana’s harassment appeared to have started in middle school and 
extended into high school.32 As a sophomore during the 2007-2008 school 
year, Sladjana complained to her family and friends of being picked on 
and reportedly informed the school of these instances.33 Following an 
incident where Sladjana was allegedly pushed down the stairs at school, 
Sladjana threatened to kill herself and was admitted to the hospital.34 
After her release and prior to her return to school in the winter of 2008, 
her mother met with members of the school, including the principal, 
Spiccia, and guidance counselor, Goss.35 At this meeting, Sladjana’s 
mother informed them that Sladjana was in the hospital because of trouble 
at school and asked the educators to protect her. A plan was built to 
protect Sladjana.36 Following this meeting, there were very few reported 
instances of bullying or harassment noted by the court. 37 In the fall of 
2008, Sladjana began homeschooling.38 On October 2, 2008, Sladjana 
killed herself.39 
The Eleventh District found that Spiccia, the principal, was unaware of 
the alleged incidents of bullying and harassment prior to the meeting 
where the plan was formulated, and even if he were not, the plan put in 
place at that meeting was “in place for an adequate period of time to 
address [Sladjana’s] issues.”40 Because he “set forth a specific plan, relied 
on his staff to carry it out, and checked on Sladjana’s progress,” the court 
found that he did not act in bad faith, maliciously, or recklessly.41 
Additionally, the court held that although the guidance counselor, 
Goss, met with Sladjana multiple times after the meeting to discuss 
incidents as they occurred, Goss’s failure to communicate about Sladjana 
to other individuals besides Spiccia, such as Sladjana’s therapist, did not 
rise to the level of recklessness.42 The court noted that even though Goss’s 
“support for Sladjana may ultimately not have addressed her mental 
health issues or stopped all conflicts . . . this does not mean that Goss’[s] 
conduct rises to the level necessary to find that her actions were reckless, 
 
 31.  Id. at 341-42. 
 32.  Id. at 342. 
 33.  Id. at 342. 
 34.  Id. at 343-44. 
 35.  Id. at 343-44. 
 36.  Id. at 344. 
 37.  Id. at 349. 
 38.  Id. at 346. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 349. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 350. 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/8
2021] IMMUNITY CONFUSION 313 
wanton, or demonstrated malice.”43 
The Twelfth District came to similar conclusions in Estate of Smith v. 
Western Brown Local School District, although the court applied both a 
wanton and a reckless standard to the educators’ conduct, rather than just 
a recklessness standard.44 In Smith, the Twelfth District affirmed the grant 
of summary judgment to the defendant principal, assistant principal, and 
superintendent based on their immunity under R.C. § 2744.03.45 The 
complaint, brought by the estate of Chance Smith, alleged that the 
educators should be held liable for Chance’s suicide because they failed 
to exercise care in regard to Chance.46 Before Chance took his own life, 
the school was made aware of multiple notes directed at Chance or his 
friends. All three of the notes contained threats to kill Chance.47 The 
principal suspected that Chance was the author of all three notes, and 
some students corroborated this suspicion.48 One of Chance’s friends, 
initially suspected of writing the notes, conveyed to the principal that he 
was worried that Chance was going to kill himself and relayed some 
strange conversations he had recently had with Chance.49 The Monday 
after, Chance did not show up for school and he was found dead that 
evening.50 Before they knew about Chance’s death, the principal and 
superintendent had a conversation where they decided that Chance should 
be “referred for a mental health evaluation and placed in their virtual 
learning program.”51 
The Twelfth District set out two different standards under which an 
educator can be liable for conduct related to bullying. First, it held that 
“[w]anton misconduct is the failure to exercise any care toward those to 
whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances where there is a great 
probability that harm will result.”52 Second, the Twelfth District held that 
“[r]eckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or 
indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is 
unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than 
negligent conduct.”53 The court held that “the defendants are immune 
from liability in this action unless the Estate can show that one of the 
 
 43.  Id. (omitting the court’s determination as to the superintendent’s immunity, which is based on 
a general distance from the issue, and a reliance on her employees).  
 44.  26 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). 
 45.  Id. at 902. 
 46.  Id. at 901. 
 47.  Id. at 893. 
 48.  Id. at 893-4. 
 49.  Id. at 894. 
 50.  Id. at 894-5. 
 51.  Id. at 895. 
 52.  Id. at 901 (quoting Anderson v. Masillon, 983 N.E.2d 266). 
 53.  Id. (quoting Anderson, 983 N.E.2d 266, at 273). 
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exceptions to immunity identified in [R.C. §] 2744.03(A)(6)(b) 
applies.”54 To the Twelfth District, the key difference between the wanton 
and reckless definitions is whether the risk is known. If there is a duty of 
care owed, and that duty is not exercised, the individual can be liable for 
wanton conduct. For the conduct to be reckless, the individual must know 
of the risk and disregard it or act indifferently towards it. Wanton conduct 
does not require that the risk of harm be known, but rather that no care 
was given at all. Potentially, in contrast, conduct could be considered 
reckless if the “conscious disregard” or “indifference” is unreasonable 
given actual or expected knowledge of a risk of harm. 
In Smith, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show the 
defendants acted in a wanton or reckless manner, and therefore the 
educators were protected by R.C. § 2744.03.55 The court found that 
educators “went to great lengths to gather information, assess the nature 
of the threats contained in the notes, and ultimately to contact Chance’s 
parents.”56 Although the principal had formulated the suspicion that 
Chance authored the notes, the court found that the principal “could not 
reasonably believe that the notes, instigated by Chance to secure the 
attention of his girlfriend, constituted a real threat that Chance would hurt 
himself or his girlfriend. . .”57 
Additionally, as soon as the educators learned that Chance had 
threatened to kill his friend and then kill himself, they acted immediately 
by calling Chance’s parents.58 The court did not give weight to the fact 
that Chance had not been in school in over 48 hours.59 Because of the 
investigation and swift action, the court could not find that any of the 
educators acted recklessly or in a wanton manner. 
Unlike the standards in Vidovic or Estate of Smith, the Eleventh 
District’s analysis focused on “willful and wanton,” and interpreted a 
“grossly negligent standard” to fall under the immunity exceptions as 
well.60 In Mohat v. Horvath, the Eleventh District affirmed a trial court’s 
denial of a motion to dismiss based on immunity under R.C. § 2744.03.61 
In Mohat, the parents of E.M. filed a complaint against E.M.’s high school 
teacher, Horvath, alleging that E.M. committed suicide as a result of his 
 
 54.  Id. at 900. 
 55.  Id. at 902. 
 56.  Id. at 901. 
 57.  Id.. 
 58.  Id. at 902. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Mohat v. Horvath, 2013-Ohio-4290, ¶23 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). Judges Cynthia Westcott Rice, 
Timothy P. Cannon, and Colleen Mary O’Toole heard this case. Judges Cannon and O’Toole also heard 
Vidovic, which was decided differently. 
 61.  Id.  
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failing to protect E.M. from bullying in his class by other students.62 
E.M.’s parents alleged in their complaint that E.M. was subjected to 
“unrelenting name-calling, teasing, and verbal harassment,” including 
“vile and degrading names that were sexual in nature, such as ‘fag,’ 
‘queer,’ and ‘homo.’”63 Additionally, E.M. was repeatedly pushed, 
shoved, and hit.64  
The Mohats alleged that Horvath “knew about this bullying and 
harassment directed against E.M.” because most of it took place in his 
classroom, and E.M. complained to him about it.65 Additionally, the 
Mohats alleged that on the day E.M. committed suicide, another student 
told E.M., in Horvath’s class and in front of Horvath, “Why don’t you go 
home and shoot yourself? No one would miss you.”66 Further, the Mohats 
alleged that Horvath knew or should have known that another student at 
Mentor High School had committed suicide as a result of bullying.67 
Despite his intimate knowledge of these incidents, Horvath allegedly did 
nothing to stop the bullying and never reported it to school officials.68 
The Mohats alleged that Horvath’s actions were “grossly negligent.”69 
Horvath argued this claim should be barred by his immunity because “a 
claim for gross negligence does not require a showing of malice, bad faith, 
or wanton or reckless conduct” as required by R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b).70 
The Eleventh District, however, found that “Ohio Appellate Districts 
have held that ‘gross negligence is evidenced by willful and wanton 
conduct,’” and therefore falls under the immunity exceptions.71 
The Eleventh District found that the Mohats had sufficiently alleged 
facts that, if proven, would plausibly allow them to recover.72 The court 
held that the Mohats’ allegations that the repeated bullying and 
harassment occurred in Horvath’s classroom with him present and that 
Horvath had actual knowledge of E.M. being bullied and failed to do 
anything about it were enough to overcome a motion to dismiss.73 
In 2014, the Sixth Circuit held that educators who made a deliberate 
decision not to enforce school policy acted reckless and therefore were 
 
 62.  Id. at ¶2. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at ¶3. 
 66.  Id. at ¶4. 
 67.  Id. at ¶5. 
 68.  Id. at ¶6. 
 69.  Id. at ¶7. 
 70.  Id. at ¶23. 
 71.  Id. (quoting Harsh v. Lorain Cty. Speedway, Inc., 675 N.E.2d 885 (8th Dist. 1996)). 
 72.  Id. at ¶29. 
 73.  Id. at ¶32-4. 
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not protected by immunity under R.C. § 2744.03.74 In Shively, student 
T.S. was subject to gender- and religion-based bullying at school for 
several years.75 T.S. and her parents brought suit in federal court against 
the district and individual educators and administrators under substantive 
due process, equal protection, and state-law tort claims.76 The district 
court denied qualified immunity to all of the individual educators.77 The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision, writing: “[t]he question of 
recklessness turns on whether Defendants knew of and could foresee 
harm to a student and whether they took actions in response to the 
harassment.”78 
 There is no clear agreement between Ohio appellate courts as to what 
the appropriate standard for determining whether an individual educator’s 
conduct constitutes an exception to R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). A broad and 
ambiguous interpretation of the statute thus far has led a variance in 
subjective standards applied by Ohio courts to determine whether 
immunity applies to educators in school bullying cases.79 Thus, it is no 
surprise that the holdings of Ohio appellate districts run the gambit.80 In 
many cases where immunity was granted to the individual employees, the 
court relied solely on a determination that the employee’s conduct did not 
rise to “the high standard of being described as reckless, wanton, or with 
malice” without providing a clear application of the individual terms used 
in that standard.81 
2. A.J.R., et al., v. Lute, et al.82 
In the fall of 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio heard argument in A.J.R. 
v. Lute.83 Plaintiffs, the child A.R. and her parents, brought suit against 
the Toledo City School District and individual educators.84 They alleged 
that A.R. was bullied and poked in the face with a pencil by her fellow 
students, and the educators acted recklessly and should have protected 
 
 74.  Shively v. Green Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 579 Fed. Appx. 348, 360 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 75.  Id. at 350. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 359-60. 
 79.  See cases discussed supra Part II(C)(1). 
 80.  These holdings nearly all come on motions for summary judgment, which limits the factual 
evaluation. To answer immunity questions, the court stands on a basis of presumption, dealing with many 
“presuming [blank]”s and “even if”’s. See, infra, Part II(D). 
 81.  O’Toole v. Denihan, 889 N.E.2d 505 (2008). 
 82.  A.J.R. v. Lute, 168 N.E.3d 1157 (Ohio 2020). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 1158. Throughout the briefs filed by the plaintiffs and defendants, they switch back and 
forth between using “A.J.R.” and “A.R.” to identify the child. The appellate court and Supreme Court of 
Ohio both use “A.R.,” as will this Comment. 
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A.R. from her injury.85  
The educators asserted that they took “various steps” to address the 
reports of bullying they received from A.R.’s parents.86 The principal, 
Schade, spoke to the students, including the student who eventually hurt 
A.R., after being informed that A.R. was being teased.87 Schade also 
stated that he would frequently visit A.R. during lunch, and A.R. had 
always told him that “things were going okay.”88 
The acting assistant principal, Skaff, stated that she spoke to A.R. after 
the initial report from A.R.’s father and would check in periodically.89 
Each time, Skaff stated that A.R. seemed fine.90 A.R.’s teacher, Lute, 
asserted that once she was informed of the teasing, she “monitored A.R. 
and the other students,” and “would have intervened” if the student who 
injured A.R. would have attempted to tease her.91 
The trial court granted the school’s motion for summary judgment, 
holding that the educators were immune under R.C. § 2744.03 and that 
A.R. and her parents failed to demonstrate an issue of fact as to whether 
the educators disregarded a “known or obvious risk of physical harm to 
A.R.”92 On appeal, the Sixth District found there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the educators’ conduct was reckless and held 
that the trial court had erred in granting the motion for summary 
judgment.93 
The main issue before the Supreme Court of Ohio was whether or not 
the educators acted recklessly.94 Settling this issue would determine 
whether they should be granted immunity under R.C. § 2744.03.95 The 
Court accepted jurisdiction over a sole proposition of law raised in the 
appeal: 
There can be no finding of reckless conduct or perverse disregard of a 
known risk where the record establishes that in response to reports of 
student teasing, educators promptly speak with the students about the 
teasing, frequently ask how they are doing, and regularly monitor the 
students in the lunchroom and classroom. Under these circumstances, if a 
student with no history of violence later pokes another student with a 
pencil, [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §] 2744.03(A)(6) shields these educators 
 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 1159.  
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 1159. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 1157. 
 95.  Id. 
11
McMillin: Immunity Confusion
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
318 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
from liability.96 
The Court was persuaded by this proposition.97 It held that the educators 
“did not act in perverse disregard of a known risk,” and therefore “their 
conduct was not reckless.”98 Because the educators “took steps to address 
the reports of bullying” and “paid special attention to [A.R.] and the 
situation,” the court held that “they neither consciously disregarded any 
risk nor were indifferent to any risk.”99  
The A.J.R. court paid special attention to two cases when determining 
the standard for recklessness: O’Toole v. Deniham100 and Anderson v. 
Massillon.101 The O’Toole definition of recklessness, as included in the 
opinion, is “a perverse disregard of a known risk.”102 Writing that “[t]his 
court has further explained [since O’Toole] that ‘reckless conduct is 
characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or 
obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the 
circumstances . . .”103 Despite the difference in language (“perverse” 
versus “conscious” disregard), the Court treated O’Toole and Anderson 
as equivalent.104 Throughout the analysis, however, the Court applied the 
O’Toole standard of recklessness and quoted O’Toole in its holding.105  
D. The Three Standards 
The text of R.C. § 2744.03 is straightforward: for an employee of the 
government to be immune, their conduct must not be “with malicious 
purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”106 In school-
bullying cases, courts rarely apply the former two clauses of this 
provision, and instead focus on the “wanton or reckless” standard.107 But 
the difference between wanton and reckless conduct is unclear. The Sixth 
Circuit distinguishes the two by noting that “[a] person acts wantonly if 
that person acts with a complete ‘failure to exercise any care whatsoever.’ 
One acts recklessly if one is aware that one’s conduct ‘creates an 
 
 96.  Id. at 1160. 
 97.  Id. at 1161. 
 98.  Id. at 1163. 
 99.  Id. at 1162. 
 100.  889 N.E.2d 505 (Ohio 2008).  
 101.  983 N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 2012). 
 102.  A.J.R. v. Lute, 168 N.E.3d 1157 (Ohio 2020), quoting O’Toole, 507. 
 103.  Id. (quoting Anderson, 268). 
 104.  See, e.g., id. at 1162. 
 105.  Id. at 1163. 
 106.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). 
 107.  In a situation where the educator was the bully, there likely would be an application of 
“malicious” or “in bad faith.” That is not the case for the purposes of the cases highlighted in this 
Comment. 
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unreasonable risk of physical harm to another.’”108 This suggests that 
wanton conduct is more along the lines of non-conduct, and reckless 
conduct is more affirmative conduct.109 
However, the O’Toole definition of recklessness applied in A.J.R. does 
not reflect the Sixth Circuit’s approach. Instead, the O’Toole court 
explained:   
an actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of others if he does 
an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to 
do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially 
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.110  
Under this definition, conduct is considered reckless if (1) the conduct 
recklessly disregards the safety of others, or (2) the actor has a duty to 
another and the failure to perform that duty creates an unreasonable risk 
of harm. 
Effectively, these definitions conflate wantonness and recklessness to 
the point of utter confusion. A simple understanding of the terms would 
lead to three potential standards of conduct that fall under wanton and 
reckless: 
 Standard 1:     a failure to exercise any care (wanton). 
 Standard 2:      a failure to perform an existing duty to another, creating        
                               an unreasonable risk of harm (reckless). 
 Standard 3:     conduct that disregards the safety of others (reckless). 
These standards, however, become not-so-simple as courts continue to 
conflate them with each other.   
Some Ohio courts, such as that in Vidovic, hold that because some 
action was taken, the conduct was not reckless, but does not mention 
“wanton” in the paragraph at all, despite using reasoning that would likely 
fall under Standard 1.111 In Smith, the court held that “[w]anton 
misconduct is the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a 
duty of care is owed in circumstances where there is a great probability 
that harm will result,” which effectively conflates Standards 1 and 2.112 
The Smith court did recognize “reckless” and “wanton” as separate 
determinations but then conflated the definition of the two into one 
 
 108.  Shively, 579 Fed. Appx. at 359 (quoting Spears v. Akron Police Dep’t, 2010-Ohio-632 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2010)) (internal citations omitted). 
 109.  This is not a direct allusion to the term “affirmative action” applied in § 1983 cases, but 
perhaps a tertiary one. 
 110.  O’Toole v. Denihan, ¶73 (2008) (quoting Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 104-5 
(1990) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE L. OF TORTS, §500) (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). 
 111.  Vidovic, 29 N.E.3d 338, 349 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). 
 112.  26 N.E.3d 890, 901 (quoting Anderson v. Masillon, 983 N.E.2d 266, 273). 
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definition of “wanton.”113 In Mohat, the court held that the conduct was 
not “willful and wanton,” because the teacher failed to take any action 
after being given notice of bullying, but did not speak to duty, effectively 
combining Standards 1 and 3.114 The Sixth Circuit in Shively focused their 
analysis on “whether [d]efendants knew of and could foresee harm to a 
student and whether they took actions in response to the harassment,” 
which conflates Standards 1 and 2, placing its analysis firmly in the first 
half of Standard 2 and then substituting Standard 1 for the latter half of 
Standard 2.115 These differences are not subtle, and the variance between 
the discernible standards and the application of those standards forges an 
opaque, and dangerous, lens through which courts view educators’ 
conduct. 
III. DISCUSSION  
The use of different legal standards for immunity under R.C.§ 2744.03 
leaves courts confused with how to proceed in these cases. How are 
plaintiffs expected to understand whether or not they have a claim? How 
are defendants to know what conduct is expected from them? And, most 
importantly of all, how should Ohio courts determine immunity in cases 
of school-bullying-caused-suicide cases? 
Each of the discernible standards—(1) a failure to exercise any care; 
(2) a failure to perform an existing duty to another, creating an 
unreasonable risk of harm; and (3) conduct that disregards the safety of 
others—fall short of providing a clear answer to these questions. Courts 
are so bent on upholding immunity in broad policy strokes that they 
neglect the seriousness of the issue at hand, which is that children are 
killing themselves. Opaque standards and inconsistent application yield 
unclear expectations of conduct for educators, which in turn results in 
inconsistent actions taken to provide adequate support for students who 
are subjected to bullying or to prevent bullying in the first place. 
A. O’Toole and Anderson 
Anderson v. Masillon, the other case relied on by the court in A.J.R., 
should have clarified this discrepancy. The first line of the syllabus in 
Anderson reads, “‘[w]illful,’ ‘wanton,’ and ‘reckless’ describe different 
and distinct degrees of care and are not interchangeable.”116 The Anderson 
court, writing after O’Toole, defines these three terms in the context of 
 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Mohat v. Horvath, 2013-Ohio-4290 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
 115.  Id. at 359-60. 
 116.  Anderson, 983 N.E.2d 266, Syllabus 1. 
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R.C. § 2744.03 clearly and distinctly:  
Willful misconduct implies an intentional deviation from a clear duty or 
from a definite rule of conduct, a deliberate purpose not to discharge some 
duty necessary to safety, or purposefully doing wrongful acts with 
knowledge or appreciation of the likelihood of resulting injury.117 
 
Wanton misconduct is the failure to exercise any care toward those whom 
a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is a great probability 
that harm will result.118 
 
Reckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or 
indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is 
unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than 
negligent conduct.119 
These three categories of conduct are distinct and separate and are not 
interchangeable under Anderson.120 R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) lists two of 
these categories specifically: “wanton” and “reckless.”121 The Anderson 
court clarified explicitly that “wanton” and “reckless” denote different 
categories of conduct, either of which is sufficient to “pierce the shield” 
of immunity given their specific inclusion in R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b).122 
Yet, despite this purported clarity, the Supreme Court of Ohio in A.J.R., 
eight years after Anderson, still used the terms “wanton” and “reckless” 
interchangeably when deciding whether individual employees should be 
granted immunity.123 The Court was presented with a proposition of law 
in A.J.R. that read, in part, that “[t]here can be no finding of reckless 
conduct or perverse disregard of a known risk . . .”124 The attorneys for 
the educators themselves separated the (incorrect) definition of “perverse 
disregard” from the category of recklessness, seemingly to follow 
Anderson. Further, their proposition of law states that under the 
circumstances of this particular case, “[R.C. §] 2744.03(A)(6) shields 
these educators from liability.”125  
But, in deciding A.J.R., the Court only analyzed the conduct under a 
recklessness standard pulled from O’Toole. This indicates one of two 
things: (1) the court is conflating, or using interchangeably, the terms 
“wanton” and “reckless” as one single exception to R.C. § 
 
 117.  Id. at 273 (citing Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 527, 80 N.E.2d 122 (1948)). 
 118.  Id. (citing Hawkins v. Ivy, 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 117-8, 363 N.E.2d 367 (1977)). 
 119.  Id. (citing Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 104-5, 559 N.E.2d 705 (1990)).  
 120.  Id. at 274. 
 121.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). 
 122.  Anderson v. Masillon, 2012-Ohio-5711, ¶23. 
 123.  A.J.R., 168 N.E.3d 1157, 1160, 1161, and 1163. 
 124.  Id. at 1160. 
 125.  Id. 
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2744.03(A)(6)(b), or (2) the court requires a plaintiff attempting to pierce 
the shield of immunity to specifically categorize the conduct as “wanton” 
or “reckless,” and the analysis is limited to whichever is alleged 
specifically. The former is considerably more likely than the latter, 
especially given the conflicting and mangled definitions the court used to 
decide A.J.R. The court continually used the O’Toole phrasing of a 
“perverse disregard,” which, when analyzed through an Anderson lens, 
does not fit into any of the categories. 
Even more confusing, the Supreme Court of Ohio clearly has read the 
opinion in Anderson, as they quote it directly in A.J.R.126 The opinion in 
Anderson is not very long,127 and is very explicit: wanton and reckless are 
not interchangeable and each describe a separate category of conduct that 
can pierce the shield of immunity.128 But rather than follow this clear 
delineation—which, as discussed later, would likely yield the same 
result—the Court appears to agree with the dissent in Anderson, although 
without explicitly doing so. 
The dissent in Anderson argued that “wanton” and “reckless” should 
be used interchangeably because the goal of the immunity statute is to 
protect employees of political subdivisions from liability for negligent 
conduct.129 The dissent notes that “[a]lthough there may be subtle 
differences among ‘reckless,’ ‘wanton,’ and ‘willful,’ in the context of the 
immunity statute the three words all function to describe conduct greater 
than negligence.”130 In other words, the statute should read instead that 
the employee is immune from liability if the employee’s conduct was 
negligent. The words “wanton” and “reckless” in R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) 
are not separate categories of conduct but simply indicators that conduct 
rises to a level above negligence. 
If the A.J.R. opinion applied this interpretation of R.C. § 
2744.03(A)(6)(b), then there is at least a discernible, logical holding: the 
specific definitions of “wanton” and “reckless” need not be clarified or 
separated, because as long as the educators conduct does not rise above 
negligence, the educators are protected. 
The problem with the A.J.R. holding, however, is that although the 
logic may be discernible, it is by no means structurally sound. Beyond 
seemingly relying on a dissent in a case where the majority is cited to in 
their own opinion, a simple, plain reading of the statute indicates the 
opposite. In Anderson, the court addresses the three different categories 
of conduct—willful, wanton, and reckless—because different sections of 
 
 126.  Id. at 1161. 
 127.  The opinion is only ten pages, with an additional a two-page dissent. 
 128.  Anderson v. Masillon, 983 N.E.2d 266, 274. 
 129.  Id. at 276 (Lanziger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 130.  Id. (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the Ohio immunity statute, R.C. § 2744, use those words distinctly. R.C. 
§ 2744.02(B)(1)(b) affords immunity to political subdivisions from 
liability for injuries caused by a fire-department vehicle as long as the 
operation of the vehicle does not constitute “willful or wanton 
misconduct;” R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) affords liability to political-
subdivision employees for “acts or omissions not committed in a wanton 
or reckless manner.”131 The word choice is particular, careful, and 
important. 
Further, if the legislature’s intention was to solely protect political-
subdivision employees from their negligent conduct, why not simply do 
so? “Wanton” and “reckless” are specific terms with specific meanings. 
If only one of the words were used, then it would be read specifically. 
Logically, it is unsound to argue that, because two specific words were 
used, they each lose their particular meaning in service of a basic 
separation between negligent conduct and conduct greater than negligent. 
Yet, this is what the Supreme Court did in A.J.R.. Rather than 
acknowledge and apply the clarity of Anderson, the Court chose instead 
to apply the O’Toole recklessness standard, which is both outdated and 
only half of the analysis required for an immunity analysis under R.C. § 
2744.03(A)(6)(b). The question remains: why not just follow Anderson? 
B. An Application of Anderson 
The simplest explanation for the holding in Anderson is that the Court 
sought to broaden immunity afforded to employees of political 
subdivisions. At first glance, it may appear that conflating “wanton” and 
“reckless” into one concept of “not negligent” would lead to the exception 
in R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) being applied more often, and therefore there 
being less immunity granted. However, this is unlikely. Instead, the 
Frankenstein standard adopted by the Court in A.J.R. takes the most 
restrictive aspects of “wanton” and “reckless” and combines them into a 
new standard that is even harder to satisfy. 
But what if the Court did decide to follow and apply Anderson? Rather 
than conflate two terms into one concept, following Anderson would treat 
the analysis of whether or not to afford immunity as it is written in R.C. 
§ 2744.03(A)(6)(b): the employee is afforded immunity unless their acts 
or omissions were in a wanton or reckless manner. Anderson is clear that 
the terms cannot be used interchangeably.132 Using the definitions 
provided by the Anderson court, the A.J.R. court could have derived clear 
standards for each term, including: 
 
 131.  Id. at 268. 
 132.  Anderson, 274. 
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Wanton: 
(1) the failure to exercise any care 
(2) toward those whom a duty of care is owed 




(1) the conscious disregard of or indifference 
(2) to a known or obvious risk of harm to another  
(3) that is unreasonable under the circumstances and 
(4) is substantially greater than negligent conduct.133 
If the conduct of the employee can be categorized as either wanton or 
reckless, they are not immune. Necessarily, if the conduct rises to the level 
of wanton or reckless, the conduct will not be considered negligent. 
The importance of this delineation cannot be overstated: wanton and 
reckless describe different types of conduct, each of which is enough to 
pierce the shield of immunity. An employee who acts wantonly has a duty 
of care towards a person, fails to exercise any care at all, and there is a 
great probability that harm will result. There has to be a “great 
probability” that harm will result, not simply the existence of a known or 
obvious risk of harm. Recklessness, in contrast, requires that a risk of 
harm be known or obvious, and the employee consciously disregards or 
is unreasonably indifferent to that risk. 
Each term is balancing two concepts: the risk of harm and the level of 
action required. The wanton standard only applies if there is an existing 
duty of care. The rest of the analysis puts more weight on the risk of harm 
and less on the action because the risk has to be likely to occur and the 
employee took no action whatsoever. The reckless standard, on the other 
hand, puts more weight on the action and less on the risk of harm because 
the risk of harm need only be known or obvious, and then the employee 
consciously disregarded that risk. These concepts denote completely 
different types of conduct. The balancing of risk and action is different 
under each category because each category is meant to protect individuals 
from different types of conduct. By conflating the categories, the Supreme 
Court was able to pick and choose which elements of each to apply, 
thereby creating a hybrid standard that is neither wanton nor reckless. 
The Supreme Court should have applied Anderson to the facts of A.J.R. 
to determine whether each educator should have been protected by R.C. 
§ 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Their individual conduct should have been analyzed 
for wantonness or recklessness. Employing that analysis, the court in 
A.J.R. would likely have come to the same conclusion but without 
confusing the law. 
 
 133.  Id. at 273 (formatting and numbering added). 
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For example, under Anderson, applying the wanton analysis to the 
principal, Schade, and assistant principal, Skaff, it is clear that they both 
exercised some care by checking in on A.R. after receiving reports of 
bullying. The analysis would stop there, but arguendo, turning to the third 
prong, there was little to no indication that there was a “great probability” 
that A.R. would suffer harm. There was some indication that A.R. was 
subject to teasing and some minor pushing, but the circumstances did not 
create a “great probability” that A.R. would suffer harm. As for 
recklessness, it would be difficult to argue that, even if the risk was known 
and obvious, Schade and Skaff “consciously disregarded” the risk. 
Instead, they took reasonable steps to check in on A.R. once being made 
aware of the teasing. Had the Supreme Court followed Anderson, they 
likely would still have granted summary judgment for Schade and Skaff. 
As for A.R.’s teacher, Lute, even if the Court found that “monitoring” 
was not enough to satisfy the first element of wanton conduct under 
Anderson, then it would still be unlikely that the Court would find that 
there was a “great probability” of harm. Given the allegations in the 
record, the Court would presumably find that it was unlikely that A.R. 
would suffer harm and therefore the educators’ conduct would not have 
risen to the level of wanton. Further, Lute’s conduct would likely not have 
been considered reckless because, even if Lute knew about some risk and 
was indifferent to it, the Court would likely find that she did not act 
unreasonably.134 Perhaps even placing the two students at the same table 
would not be unreasonable if Lute had known that the other student who 
stabbed/poked A.R. with the pencil had teased A.R.—evidence in the 
record showed thar A.R. often sat with the students reported to have 
teased her.  
If the Court had followed Anderson directly, its decision in A.J.R. 
would almost certainly remain the same. The two-part analysis under R.C. 
§ 2744.03(A)(6)(b)135 yields the same result as the Frankenstein-standard 
employed by the Court. However, following Anderson would have 
avoided the almost certain future confusion the actual holding will cause. 
 
 134.  This part of the analysis is the closest to changing under an Anderson analysis, but even still, 
would not likely change the outcome. 
 135.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) actually has a four-part test for conduct. Was the 
conduct (1) with malicious purpose, (2) in bad faith, (3) in a wanton manner, or (4) in a reckless manner? 
“In addition to any immunity or defense referred to in division (A)(7) of this section and in 
circumstances not covered by that division or sections 3314.07 and 3746.24 of the Revised Code, 
the employee is immune from liability unless . . . [t]he employee's acts or omissions were with 
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner . . .” 
  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). This Comment has focused 
on the latter two, as do most courts. Rarely are courts asked to determine whether 
an educator acted maliciously or in bad faith. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
When a bullied student commits suicide, who should be liable, and 
when? Under A.J.R., the answer is even more unclear than it was before. 
Instead of providing guidance and clarifying the three standards from 
appellate courts, the Supreme Court created yet another standard to apply. 
As was noted above, “bad facts can make bad law.” In A.J.R. v. Lute, 
there was no deviation from this maxim. The case brought by the plaintiff 
was so weak that it essentially gave the Supreme Court a chance to choose 
whatever standard it pleased to determine whether the individual 
educators should be afforded immunity and to cement that as the standard 
for R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) going forward. Presented with that chance, 
the Court did just that: flying in the face of their own decision in 
Anderson, the Court instead cobbled together a Frankenstein of a 
standard, relying on the out-of-date O’Toole and carefully isolated 
phrases and sentences from Anderson. Rather than embrace the clarity of 
the distinct categories of conduct drawn and defined in Anderson, the 
Court instead mashed together “wanton” and “reckless” into one simple 
concept: not negligent. This loose reading of the statute, seemingly built 
on the lone dissent in Anderson, was not only unnecessary to rule in the 
manner the court wanted to in A.J.R. but will only further confuse the 
already befuddled Ohio appellate courts. 
A student getting poked in the face with a pencil is considerably 
different from a student committing suicide because they were bullied at 
school. As many courts noted in cases where students did commit suicide, 
the immunity analysis should be devoid of emotion.136 But that is exactly 
why the Supreme Court should have taken advantage of the opportunity 
presented by A.J.R.—bad facts could have made clear law.137 Instead, the 
Supreme Court further confused the issue by conflating “wanton” and 
“reckless.” As it stands now, the precedent created by A.J.R. reads more 
like a first-semester law student’s midterm definition of recklessness. 
The consequences of the A.J.R. decision are not limited to the already 
horrific instances where a student commits suicide. R.C. § 
2744.03(A)(6)(b) is an immunity exception for all individual employees 
of political-subdivisions in Ohio. This includes firefighters, correctional 
staff, police officers, and anyone else employed by the government. A.J.R. 
states that “[b]ecause appellants did not perversely disregard a known 
risk, appellants could not have been reckless, and the trial court correctly 
 
 136.  See, e.g., Vidovic v, Hoynes, 29 N.E.3d 338, 351 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (“We recognize that 
Sladjana’s death is tragic. However, we are required to evaluate the matter under the appropriate standard 
of law . . .”); and, Estate of Smith, 26 N.E.3d 890, 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (“Although Chance’s death 
was tragic and an immense loss, that tragedy does not mean the standard for showing wantonness or 
recklessness is any less.”). 
 137.  This Comment is hesitant to say, “bad facts make good law.”  
20
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/8
2021] IMMUNITY CONFUSION 327 
granted appellants’ motion for summary judgment.”138 This means that to 
pierce the shield of a police officer’s immunity under R.C. § 
2744.03(A)(6)(b), the standard as of November 2020 is that the officer 
must perversely disregard a known risk. As discussed above, this is 
neither the definition of wanton nor reckless. The word “perverse,” a 
holdout from the outdated O’Toole, broadens immunity far beyond the 
language of the statute and the clear holding in Anderson. 
Will this lead to broader grants of immunity in cases of increasing 
severity? Potentially. Will appellate courts continue to apply various 
standards? Most likely. Will the Supreme Court of Ohio need to address 
this question again in the future? Hopefully. Presented with a case where 
an eight-year-old committed suicide after being bullied,139 the court likely 
would not have been so cavalier in the creation of its Frankenstein-
standard. Had the Supreme Court followed its own decision in Anderson, 
the immunity standard would have been clarified and distinct, not only 
providing lower courts with the correct standard, but also giving clarity 
to the employees themselves regarding the conduct for which they should 
expect to be liable. 
But that is not the law. Instead, plaintiffs, defendants, judges, teachers, 
officers, and citizens are left with an unclear, ambiguous standard. As 
more students commit suicide after being bullied at school, fewer and 
fewer people will be held responsible. 
 
 
 138.   A.J.R., 168 N.E.2d 1157, 1163. 
 139.  Melissa Iati, An 8-year-old killed himself after being bullied, lawsuit says. The school wants 
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